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abstract
For the past twenty years or so, the global harbour space has un-
dergone a real transition. The management model of  the "Landlord 
port" has gradually stood out as the dominant model of harbour 
management in the world. In many countries, the State grants 
terminals to private operators and transforms the status of Harbour 
Authorities. They still pilot the port development strategy but lose 
their functions in port operation. This backward move of the State 
places the harbour space in a paradoxical situation, between missions 
of general interest and the defense of private interests. Can we still 
consider the port as a common good? Two visions on this community 
can be expressed: an economic vision and a civic vision.
palabras clave: Harbour management, harbour governance, public 
policies, common good.
resumen
Durante los últimos veinte años, el espacio portuario ha sufrido 
una verdadera transición. Poco a poco, el modelo de gestión cono-
cido como «Landlord port» se impone como modelo dominante de 
gestión portuaria en el mundo. En varios países, el Estado concede 
los terminales a operadores privados y transforma el estatuto de las 
Autoridades Portuarias. Estas siguen siendo los pilotos de la estrategia 
de desarrollo portuario, pero pierden toda prerrogativa en materia de 
explotación. Este retroceso del Estado coloca el espacio portuario en 
una situación paradójica, entre misión de interés general y defensa de 
intereses privados. ¿Todavía podemos considerar el puerto como un 
bien común? Dos visiones de esta comunidad pueden ser enunciadas: 
una visión económica, una visión cívica.
palabras clave: Gestión portuaria, gobernanza portuaria, políticas 
públicas, bien común.
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introduction
For the last twenty years, the global port industry, like many other 
sectors, has dealt with an in-depth reform movement largely ins-
pired by liberalism. It aims at changing a governance model based 
on the omnipresence of the State at all decisional levels. The port 
as an entity, but also a space and a territory, was conceived on two 
principles (Abbes & Guillaume, 2008): 
• The inalienable character of the maritime public domain1
• The search for general interest through the exercise of
public service.
The course to competitiveness led many countries to over-
look the second principle and promote the implication of private 
enterprises in port exploitation. However, this liberalisation is not 
privatisation. The reform did not erase all the monopolistic practi-
ces against which it pretended to set up. Finally, this new model of 
port management, also called “Landlord port”, establishes in many 
cases a hybrid organisation, not to say confuse (Guillaume, 2012), 
in which institutional and private spheres coexist with more or less 
success. We suggest in this paper that this process has created ten-
sion in many port spaces. If the concurrence imposed by liberalisa-
tion can correspond to the imperative of competitiveness ruling the 
first rank ports at a global scale, we point another reality for the 
medium ports, where there is often only one terminal to concede 
per type of traffic. In many cases, the reform has transformed a 
public monopole into a private one. Indeed, the model of the “Lan-
dlord port”, adopted by most of the ports in the world, presents the 
risk of new “levels of conflicts”, of multiple natures and origins. To 
apply a universal model of port management denies both the local 
specificities and the nodal complexities. We argue that the port 
as a territory is a particular common good that requires adapted 
1  Domaine Public Maritime (coastal state-owned lands).  35 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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governance. This paper does not offer a synthesis of the impacts 
of port reforms at a global scale but aims to enlighten some of the 
problems raised by this new “universality” in port management. 
Whilst reviewing literature, we base our analysis on a series of in-
terviews conducted in several medium European ports: Nantes-St 
Nazaire in France, Genoa and Naples in Italy and Vigo and Bilbao 
in Spain. 
We will briefly present the “Landlord port” model. We will 
then analyse the three dimensions characterising the exceptionality 
of the port; exceptionality that is, according to us, the source of the 
problems of governance. We will finally reflect on the difficulty to 
define and delimitate the perimeter of the port community, which 
is a localised relational system upon which rely the efficiency and 
the performance of these logistics interfaces.
i. characterising the “landlord port”
The model of the “Landlord port” was first described and promo-
ted by the World Bank in 1992. It was then defended by all the 
major international institutions and influenced slowly most of the 
port reforms in the world in the 90s and 2000s. This model of 
management creates a port in which land and regulations are pu-
blic with infrastructural investments depending of the State, while 
equipment investments and operations management are led by the 
private sector. This organisation corresponds to the movements of 
liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of economic activities 
and corresponds to the evolution of western economies for the last 
thirty years. 
Table 1. Four models of port management
Port Models Infrastructures Superstructures Operations
Other 
Services
Service Port Public Public Public Public majority
Tool Port Public Public Private Public/Private
Landlord Port Public Private Private Public/Private
Private Port Public Private Private Private majority
Source: World Bank 1992
 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
issn 2011-7574 (on line)
36
Eric Foulquier, Salvatore Maugeriz
In the “Landlord port” model, private operators invest port 
management and governance as their representatives are now part 
of the port authorities. Such a mutation in favour of the liberalisa-
tion of market services is recommended to mainly try to solve one 
of the major problems of the development of the port: the invest-
ment of capital, colossal, especially when it seems that the State 
cannot assume it alone in this period of public finance crisis. By 
leasing to private companies the management of superstructures 
and workers, the State “externalises” a consequent financial charge. 
At the same time, it avoids complex problems inherent to the defi-
nition of economic strategy of the port and the social questions 
associated to it. 
With nuances between ports and countries, the “Landlord 
port” seems to globally impose its main characteristics in the 
world. This model has been applied in the countries we have inves-
tigated. The idea behind the diffusion of this model is to encour-
age the State to pull out of all direct participation in operations to 
concentrate on regulation. The State keeps its prerogatives in terms 
of planning. In Italy, the Ports General Direction, referring to the 
Department of Infrastructure and Transport, is the inevitable or-
gan for planning, decision-making and development of the port, 
but all the operations are now private. In Spain, the public agency 
Puerto del Estado controls and arbitrates the funding of the ports 
but does not intervene in operations and planning. France does not 
have such a decentralised agency. However, the energy sector stays 
a public domain of intervention. In many cases, the planning and 
operations of new terminals stay under public control, through par-
ticipations in companies that are concessionaires, such as Total or 
GDF Suez in France, Petrobas in Brazil or Repsol in Spain, etc.
In Europe, this movement is heterogeneous and marked by 
national specificities. However, a few key reforms have transformed 
the State, manager of port infrastructures, into a State manager of 
a space on which operations are transferred to private operators, 
via different forms of concession or delegation. This is a movement 
conform to the process of liberalisation of services, in particular of 
transport, the European Commission wanted. 37 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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We suggest that this type of organisation presents several 
limits. This is demonstrated by the difficulties and the recurring 
conflicts marking the performance of ports in the countries we have 
studied (Foulquier, 2008). We see three main reasons to explain the 
deficiency of the present port governance and its decisional system.
ii. the three deficiencies in port governance
1. When “port authorities” lack authority
One of the general consequences of the port reform in Europe has 
been the redefinition of the role and operational modalities of the 
port authority (PA). This public organism is created by the State to 
regulate the port. The port authorities claim a “democratic” organ-
isation with a chairperson named by the institutions in charge of 
the site, which is often the State, but can also be the regions when 
the port is decentralised (France), or the Autonomous Communities 
for the ports of general interest in Spain. To make strategic deci-
sions concerning the development of the port, the chairperson leans 
upon a joint “administrative council” made up of representatives of 
the institutions in charge (State, Regions), of other local authori-
ties, of professional categories working in the port and of employees 
and dockers. It is a joint organ that claims to be democratic: each 
representative has a voice and decisions are made by the majority. 
The chairman of the PA has the role of piloting port governance, 
i.e. facilitating debates between all parts of the port administrative 
council in order to elaborate a consensus towards the adoption of 
rules and procedures in favour of the development of the port. 
However, the efficiency of this organisation is very uncer-
tain. Indeed, port democracy faces quite a difficulty: if the PA is 
in charge of elaborating the guidelines for the development of the 
port based on a consensus, it does not have the financial means to 
implement these deliberative decisions. They require funding from 
the State or from a national funding agency to be concretised. In 
other terms, the Port Authority does not have financial autonomy 
and therefore has no decisional autonomy. Several interviewees even investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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feel that the authority of the Port Authority stops at its name. In 
reality, this entity cannot implement the decisions about the invest-
ments considered to be necessary for the good operation and devel-
opment of the port. The port has its administration decentralised 
but the decision body (and the strategic running) stays centralised. 
We can associate this issue with one of the strangeness pre-
sent in the institution of the PA. It is quite remarkable that the 
State has kept everywhere the property of the land… Why was this 
not transferred to the PA? We suggest that in this period of fiscal 
drought, the State sees it as a way of securing resources it will use 
for something else. When it keeps the ownership of the maritime 
public domain, it seems that the State wants not only to avoid 
the difficulties linked to the management of port activities, but 
also make the most of the maritime public domain – this is surely 
the reason it conserves it. The State, when it keeps the control of 
the land – this is the case nearly everywhere, except in England–, 
seems to conceive the territory and the space of the port not any-
more as a public good which planning should reflect the general 
interest, but as an annuity to be maximised, that would result in 
large funds used outside the port sector. It would be necessary to 
confirm this hypothesis by comparing term by term and port by 
port, all the receipts generated by the ports and the operation and 
investment budgets allocated to them. In Italy, a port like Genoa 
estimates the receipts generated around 70 millions euros while its 
budget varies with the years and depends on the good will of the 
State2.  
This level of discretional funding explains quite well the dif-
ficulties the “Latin” ports encounter to improve their port infra-
structures […]
2  In 2008, Genoa Port has received a budget of 68 millions euros, coming from a) the inco-
me of its assets (concessions lease: 33 millions) and b) from State subventions (35 millions 
coming from the transfer of taxes perceived by the port). This way, most of the taxes 
perceived by the port (several billions) are seized by the State… On the Port Authority 
side, they estimate that a budget of 220 to 300 millions would be necessary to develop 
proper planning. 39 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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2. The perimeter of the Port Authorities: the port interface 
and the problems of territorial and institutional scales
Besides the financial question, the PA has another difficulty linked 
to the reticular nature of the space that is insufficiently thought 
and taken into consideration when composing the governance bo-
dies. We will discuss here the maritime and terrestrial accesses – 
we will concentrate mostly on the second – and the function of 
interface the port has. The port is always in between, a hyphen 
between several worlds (maritime and terrestrial) and transport sys-
tems (maritime, road, rail). The port (like the airport) constitutes 
the nodal point in a system of connections that links continents 
together. More than any other economic entity, it creates value, torn 
between its territorial anchorage, fatally local, and its national, or 
even continental, connections. A port cannot be thought as a point. 
It is a node connecting the multiple threads of a connecting net-
work. A good operation of the whole logistic system depends on the 
port, but the contrary is also true. This is why we should talk about 
a port-and-logistics system. This system must be conceived at the 
regional, and even trans-regional, scale, especially in the countries 
that have a strong regional autonomy, and under the support of 
the central State that must contribute to both regulation and fun-
ding of the infrastructures connecting the port. Indeed, no matter 
how efficient the port is, if goods cannot quickly get in or out of 
the port, the whole system will collapse. One of the conditions of 
success for the mission of economic regulation given to PA leans 
upon the quality of the connections between the sea, the port and 
its hinterland. We question here the importance of the port and te-
rrestrial services, the modernisation of the “inter-modal corridors” 
serving the ports and the construction of infrastructures outside 
the port, such as retro-port or advance port, that are at the core of 
the fluidisation of exchanges. 
If we leave apart the maritime side, the corridors raise large 
problems on the terrestrial side, as the Port Authority has no legiti-
macy to step in the regions next to the port where are located the investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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corridors connecting the port to the rest of the country and to the 
continent. This is looked after by other institutional actors such as 
the States, local authorities or other actors in transport (road, rail or 
fluvial). Also, in many cases, ports close to each other are managed 
by different port authorities that do not coordinate their decisions, 
even if the idea of “coopetition” (inter-port cooperation in a context 
of competitiveness) slowly emerges within the institutional debate 
(Lacoste & Gallais, 2012). It is worst when they try to think to-
gether about port services: there is no entity that joins all the par-
ties engaged in the trans-regional port-and-logistics system. The 
Port Authorities function in a vacuum, within their state-owned 
perimeter while we know that inter-modal corridors can concern 
several ports of a same coast, and should be adapted and financed 
by several local and regional authorities in the same trans-regional 
level. They should participate to the deliberation led by the Port 
Authority about operation and accesses. This is not the case and it 
needs to change…
Without mentioning the financial autonomy, this explains 
why several changes are required. First, while still conducting an 
integrated management of its maritime coasts3, the State should 
transfer certain prerogatives to the regions, or even better, to some 
federation of regions that are concerned by the traffic in ports. It 
is the logic pursued by the French port reform when it institutiona-
lises inter-port cooperation (Lacoste, 2009). However, can a system 
based on relationships be imposed? It will surely take many years 
before such a culture of cooperation works. In some ports, people 
evoked the examples of Bremen or Hamburg where ports depend 
on both the cities and the Länder. Others mentioned Antwerp or 
Rotterdam where the local authorities decide the future of the 
ports. But we argue that the specificities of these ports should be 
first taken into consideration. They are implanted in smaller coun-
tries than the ones we studied and where the maritime space and 
the number of international ports is less important while the place 
3   Such as the French Atlantic coast or the Spanish Atlantic Coast. 41 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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of the port economy in the national GDP is higher in Netherlands 
or in Belgium than in France, Italy or Spain… We can conclude 
that if there are divergent opinions concerning the optimal level of 
governance – the representatives of the local authorities promote 
local governance –, it clearly seems that port management must be 
extended beyond the port domain. 
Reforming the juridical status of the Port Authorities is also 
a solution mentioned, especially in Italy. The idea is to convert the 
public status of the PA into a private one like a corporate company. 
Such a reform would free the PA from the heavy decision-making 
procedures linked to the public guardianship. PA has to be more 
flexible, reactive and able to answer the needs of their operators and 
their market… PA must be more in phase with them. Administra-
tive times do not correspond to business times. 
These propositions elude the superposition of guardianships 
on the port which is one of the problems and source of many con-
flicts often evoked by the people we met. Between PA, Maritime 
Law, Business Law, Health and Safety Authorities, customs, etc… 
the management of a port deals with multiple micro-regulations. 
The creation of a private Port Authority, integrating new actors 
such as the representatives of the local authorities concerned by 
the port-and-logistics system mentioned earlier, may not erase this 
complexity. With the questions of fiefdoms, the power relationships 
between local and national authorities, always contaminated by 
electoral issues, the conflicts of interest between regulating actors 
and companies’ representatives who have an interest in both sides, 
one understands that port governance is a challenge, complicated 
again by another difficulty... 
3. The democratic illusion?  
We have presented earlier the composition of the bodies of port 
governance. We mentioned that they should be extended to other 
territorial authorities and other ports concerned by the same inter-
modal corridors in order to consider the port-and-logistics system at investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
issn 2011-7574 (on line)
42
Eric Foulquier, Salvatore Maugeriz
a right scale. Doing so, we question the perimeter of the port com-
munity. Who plays a part in the port operations and development? 
By analysing the composition of the regulation bodies of the PA in 
the countries we studied, we realise that the law-makers wanted to 
give a place to public authorities, to enterprises’ representatives, and 
to employees’ representatives via trade unions. We can question if 
this implicit definition of the “port community” is a good one. We 
suggest that it is not. Beyond problems of representations of all the 
sectors of activities involved in the port directly or indirectly, one 
actor, the civil society, is missing. It is yet the entity that embodies 
the general interest. We discuss here the “acceptability” of port 
infrastructures, a more and more recurring subject in the public 
debate, especially when the coastal space is sought-after by many 
other activities. 
Under the pressure of environmental demands by the civil 
society, the tasks of the port authorities must now take into consi-
deration environmental constraints. Since the signature of the Aar-
hus Convention in 1998, a public consultation must be organised 
before any planning operation in most of the European countries 
(Mercadal, 2009). The ports have to deal with this new form of 
democracy. They are caught between a search for economic develo-
pment and the industrialisation of port activities and the necessary 
respect of the environment. A new mission is therefore attributed 
to the Port Authorities: they must privilege “sustainability” in their 
development plans, and integrate the ecological and environmental 
constraints in their discussions in order to develop projects accep-
table for most. We can then wonder if the exclusively “managing” 
culture of the PA allows them to assume the double challenge of 
sustainability and acceptability. 
We can doubt it. We saw that the PA must first optimise the 
land annuity of the State, i.e. maximise the use of the port zone, 
first through the lease of concessions and then by guarantying high 
tax revenue by selecting the “best operator” for each concession. 
Creating and securing jobs is another implicit mission given to the 
ports, in order to fulfil the presumed needs of the local population. 43 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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The PA, via tenders, will have to prefer the operator that offers 
the best “company plan” concerning the engaged investments, the 
provisional turnover and the number and durability of jobs. The 
indicator of “sustainability” is never mentioned as a criterion to 
select the offers… This is probably because there is no actor within 
the decision board of the PA to explicitly defend the territory or 
the space itself, with no other objective than the preservation of its 
intrinsic value as a natural space, outside its utilitarian use… The 
opening of the administrative board to representatives of national 
or local authorities did not change to doctrine of the PA on gover-
nance. Employment and economy are the only interests defended. 
Sustainability is rarely present in the discussions. It is still only a 
rhetorical and vague idea. Implicitly, we question here the notions 
of “port community”, general interest or “common good”, and as 
a consequence, we interrogate the democratic process in port go-
vernance. Two visions of the notion of “port community” can be 
confronted and they will determine the future of this democracy. 
iii. port community and common good: 
economic community vs. civic community
1. Reference to the notion of port community
The notion of port community is often referenced in debates on 
ports. It refers to the human dimension and the sociological reality 
of maritime ports (Baudez, 1988; Baudoin & Collin, 2006; Za-
lio, 2007). This ‘port humanity” is heterogeneous, composed by 
individuals who have different jobs and social status but are uni-
ted around a common interest: the development of activities in the 
port they work for. The port community is not the port authority. 
It is neither a social class nor a corporation. Jacques Guillaume 
underlines how it inscribes itself within three fields of actions: an 
operational field that is technical and connected to workers’ jobs; 
a relational field that is tactical and associated to the control of investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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the logistic system; a decisional field that is strategic and linked 
to the development of the port (Guillaume, 1996). Referring to the 
notion of port community brings us to two types of analysis. 
The first one presents the dynamic of relationships between 
port actors as a factor of performance. Port transit necessitates the 
coordination of agents around nautical, logistic, embarkation and 
disembarkation services. The efficiency of the passage through the 
port and the capacity to satisfy a demand depend on the fluidity of 
the transit and the quality of the different services. The proximity 
between very different jobs shapes an organisational reality that 
is more or less performing and able to produce more or less va-
lue, not only in terms of financial but also social capital. The port 
community is therefore a relational system localised and also pro-
ductive (Fabbe-Costes, 1992; Guerin, 2000; Fredouet & Lemestre 
2005; Fassio & Lemestre, 2009; Cezanne & Saglietto, 2011). This 
community inscribed itself in a place and a site: the port, and is 
declined into several decisional spheres whether they are formal or 
informal and institutional or not. Concerning the non-institutional 
forms of decisions, these spaces of negotiation, these “scenes” of 
governance can be associated to circles, clubs, associations, unions, 
in which sit initiated actors coming from the business world and 
where people try to influence the institutional decision. The most 
active members of these networks are often also members of the 
different boards of the “port authority”. 
Without neglecting the economical benefits from the pro-
fessional practices of a particular port community in a particular 
territory, the second type of analysis focuses on the cultural and so-
cial dimensions contained in this notion. The ecology of maritime 
ports shows the specificities in the relationships coastal people have 
with space (Vigarié, 1979). We refer her to places, to people who 
work and live in these places. This may be more about heritage 
than capital here. This approach aims to reveal all the influences 
that shape a “sense of place” we call “maritimisation” in the case 
of maritime ports. The perimeter of the community is then largely 
extended. It is inscribed in a space shaped by an alternation of 45 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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development and crisis cycles a port encounter while perpetually 
adapting to the global system. This community goes beyond the 
sphere or the club by including neighbours, residents and citizens. 
It is shaped or unshaped depending on the nature and intensity of 
the processes and the degree of mobilisation of the population con-
cerned at a certain time. Because this community depends more on 
circumstances than structures, its identification is based on empiri-
cal data and leads to a monograph or a photograph. It is not about 
understanding a system to calibrate the model, but about evalua-
ting the degree of influence maritime and port activities can have 
on coastal societies. This conception of the communitarian process 
mobilises others notions, such as the “sense of the sea” (Peron & 
Rieucau, 1996), acceptability, legitimacy or “levels of conflicts”. By 
replacing the social link at the heart of the territorial production, 
this acceptation of the term community aims to express both the 
complexity and the fragility of the port. It is complex because it is 
deeply marked by economical processes and fragile because largely 
determined by its human dimension. 
The people we met during this study mentioned these two 
definitions of the notion of community. When we asked “How 
would you define the term of port community?” and “What definition 
would you give of the port common good?”, the interviewees vacillated 
between the two visions we described. 
2. Economic community
In the first case, the community includes all the economic operators 
present in the port who preside over the port development in co-
llaboration with the port and territorial authorities. Their concern 
is purely economic: it tends to concentrate on the improvement 
of port services, the increase of facility spaces, the development of 
turnover and employment. The common aim of these actors is to 
constantly increase the traffic, to host larger boats (14000 ETU as 
against a maximum of 6000 at present); to increase the depth of 
the docks; to internationalise terrestrial traffics in order to gain investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
issn 2011-7574 (on line)
46
Eric Foulquier, Salvatore Maugeriz
some markets shares over ports in the North, the model being here 
Rotterdam, Antwerp or Hamburg. 
The common good is then defined in terms of economic 
wealth generated by the port for the operators and also for the 
society in general via 1) taxes and 2) jobs, i.e. direct and indirect 
employment created by the port economy. Such an approach is 
shared by both employers’ representatives and unions. In this ap-
proach, the actors outside the port, such as local inhabitants, are 
represented in the port exclusively via the representatives of the 
local authorities they elected. We assume that the political repre-
sentatives do “represent” well their electors. It is the “institutional” 
community… The environmental issues, or to be more specific, the 
environmental damages inherent to the development of the port 
and its hinterland, are not evoked or considered as inevitable; they 
can be managed through procedures for compensation by mutual 
agreement, on the basis of ownership rights. The notion of public 
space and public good is ignored and denied. 
Apart from the environmental aspect, the governance of this 
community, even if limited to the economic concern, is still pro-
blematic for several reasons. First, as revealed spontaneously in the 
interviews, the “port community”, even restricted to a group of 
economic operators ready to find a compromise around a solution, 
does not exist. It is quite a frequent opinion. Even for the repre-
sentative of Confindustria in Italy for example, or for one of the 
operational director of Genoa PA, “the economic port community 
is a community of interests, not a social community”. Its members 
sometimes  have common interests and when that happens, it is 
always punctual and revocable. The role of the port authority is to 
build and implement common positions, through a repeated pro-
cess based on synthesis of synthesis that allows a consensual point 
of view to emerge. 
The creation of this consensus raises issues because of the 
composition of the port committee and the possible conflicts of in-
terest between certain actors, such as the operators pulled between 
their memberships to 1) their company, 2) the port committee, 3) 47 investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
issn 2011-7574 (on line)
The port as a territory:an exceptional space or a common good?
Discussing deficiency in port governance
their main professional lobby, and 4) the type of capital (local vs 
international) mobilised by their company. This last point deserves 
an analysis as it introduces a division between local operators, an-
chored in the territory and concerned about multidimensional de-
velopment (economic, but also social and cultural) – would it be a 
cover for chauvinist and monopolistic claims – and “international” 
or “offshore” operators, concerned by economic results in order to 
satisfy their shareholders…
Such a division can concern one individual, for example Li-
gurian and Genovese employees who care for their territory and 
their environment but who are employed by multinationals that 
expect them to apply economic principles in the management of 
their activity. They might have to cancel stop-overs or close a ter-
minal, etc. if the company accounts prove their necessity with no 
concern for their own professional and social future…
This shows how complex and frequent conflicts of interest 
between operators in the port committee4 are, and how they do 
not ease the decision making process… However, the presence of 
these operators seems essential to all, including the operators and 
the employees of the PA, in order to avoid that the port authorities 
make themselves “self-referential”, i.e., the sole expression of the 
administrative and political points of view in the debates concer-
ning the port... 
The large number of institutional representations in the PA 
explains the difficult governance, even when limited to the “econo-
mic community”. The representative of the Department sits besides 
the ones of the region, the province and the city. Even when these 
institutions are politically convergent, the consensus is not easy to 
find, but when they have divergent political orientations, one can 
imagine the difficulty to find an agreement, especially when co-
ming to who pays what. If we add to this situation of potential 
disagreement the instability of governing structures, depending on 
the frequency of elections, and the long time involved for infras-
4   Italian version of the French Port Authoritiesinvestigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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tructural and economic development, we understand the difficulty 
first to define orientations and strategies and then to implement 
them.
So, even if restricted to economic and employment interests, 
port governance is not simple to conduct. Anyway, its pertinence 
does not resist the notion of “sustainability” and others present in 
the other approach of port community. 
3. Civic community
There is another definition of port community, not as frequently 
mentioned in the interviews, except from representatives of public 
authorities and employees, born and raised in the region of the port 
and usually involved in the lower ends of leadership. This port 
“community” is largely inclusive and integrates people in the port 
management, beyond their political and institutional representa-
tions. This extends the space of the port outside its state-owned 
borders to integrate inhabitants and neighbourhood committees, 
associations and other more or less formal lobbies whose interests 
are not really taken into consideration by the institutions of politi-
cal representation. 
The common good tends to be less economically defined, 
and more in terms of quality of life, access to coastal space, non-uti-
litarian use of the space of the port and outside the port. To sacrifice 
the coast to the sole development of the port is then out of question. 
Moreover, people came to realise that, through the issues of inter-
modal corridors and advance ports, operating the port affects many 
people’s lives that may have no economic, professional or personal 
connection with the port, well outside the port strict perimeter and 
the limits of the city.
It is impossible to determine for once who are the actors and 
the interests affected by port activities and it is necessary to redefine 
the notion of community according to each case. This community 
is an on-going social production and will always be polemical. It 
is an “occasional”, “political” and “opportunist” community, more 
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It is produced by a negotiating game instigated between the 
political institutions and the port authority and the “opponents” to 
the projects defined by the port committee. These opponents can 
declare themselves at any time, even in unpredictable ways. There 
are always people who were not thought about and who would lose 
something out of the development of the port. How is common 
good defined in this approach? It disappears if no structured social 
categories claim the “ownership”. The interviewees show a great 
lucidity about the capacity or even the vocation of the central State 
to embody the “general interest”. We face a form of demystification 
of the State as an actor “above the other parties”, able and deter-
mined to defend a “common good” priory defined. The “common 
good”  here is a social construction that directly depends on the 
democratic game and its possibility. It is not defined and defended 
by an overhanging, omniscient and omnipotent instance, but is the 
fragile production of social confrontations implying a large variety 
of actors with legitimate status and heterogeneous resources that 
must find a consensus. This precisely funds the specificity of the 
term “governance”, but also its great difficulty as a measure and 
a practice of institutional coordination that wishes to escape the 
imperative prescription of an external and central decider, which 
has been so far the State. Yet, it is not certain who will speak in the 
making-process of this governance, but the presence of the civil so-
ciety in the governing bodies, via the neighbourhood committees, 
the associations of inhabitants, the associations for the preserva-
tion of the environment cannot be eluded any longer, first of all to 
answer the always larger rejection of certain ports following their 
insertion in the urban infrastructure and their nuisances on local 
populations.    
The definition of a “good” decisional structure in charge of 
the elaboration and approval of the port development projects is far 
from being simple. It seems that the presence of port users in the 
committee cannot be questioned. For this reason, risks of conflicts 
of interest remain and will require new mechanisms to suppress or, 
at least, reduce them. Whatever answer is presented against this 
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at the expense of the city and the local populations. For the same 
reason, the port committee must integrate new categories and new 
stakeholders. So, the port democracy has to widen and integrate all 
the visions on its development. However, because of the diversity of 
conflict sources, the composition and the way of operating of this 
democratic decisional structure remain vague.
conclusion
None of the forms of governance tested in the three countries we 
have studied seems to face the challenge presented to the European 
port organisation by the evolution of maritime transport and the 
requirements of the Landlord port model. We could even suggest 
that everywhere, there is an embellished port authority that can be 
characterised by:
- A deficit of true autonomy, because of the lack of funds and 
political legitimacy
- A material incapacity of the port authorities to develop the 
whole port-and-logistics system in order to improve their 
own performances
- A (cultural?) incapacity to conceive the port community (it is 
everywhere limited to institutional and economic actors and 
excludes the civil society).
To conclude, port reforms have not allowed the countries we 
have studied to face and solve the problems we have underlined. 
The French, Spanish or Italian legislators have not changed radica-
lly the port, but have perpetuated central regulation by the State 
and privileged strictly economic and technical concerns. This is 
because they gave too much place to the State and created a fal-
se autonomy, they abandoned the ports and the port-and-logistics 
systems to the politician struggles between local and/or national 
public institutions, or like in France, they gave too much place to 
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or they only privileged economic and employment concerns in the 
decision making process for the port. This governance is tuned 
with globalisation and always-shorter time scales and it did not 
succeed to integrate the impacts of the development of the port on 
local life, territory and environment with the ecological and hedo-
nist demands of the urban population. 
As an economic entity at the core of global flows, port deve-
lopment benefits all the economic sectors while its wealth seems to 
be confined by the central power. While calling for regionalising 
its governance to improve it and for a port authority that would be 
solid, autonomous, and able to make and implement strategic deci-
sions, nothing is done to define decision-making mechanisms that 
1) avoid conflicts of interest, and 2) give populations a place in the 
debates that concern globalisation, national economy, but whose 
spatial consequences are mostly local. 
Only a revision of port governance, defining a “common 
good” supported by all and a port community “legitimate” to de-
cide of the future of these spaces can give confidence back to the 
ports. The perimeter of this new “port community”, called by eco-
nomic and social changes, must be characterised, even though the 
notion is vague. Fantasy in minds and discourses, it is never mate-
rialised by institutionalised figures. Community is still an idea. It 
must first become a concept and then a practice. 
One question remains: it is necessary to give the local terri-
tory a voice, but up to what level can we leave purely local inter-
ests impact the operation of an entity – the port – whose results 
influence the national economy? This difficulty is typical of the 
management of the port that constantly faces a fundamental spatial 
paradox characterised by the interface and its in-betweenness. 
This is why the State may remain an inevitable actor in port 
governance because it is always asked to make the final – unpopu-
lar – decisions. There is a paradox unveiled by the people we met in 
the research: we want the State to be less present in order to let the 
regional authorities define the best strategy for development but 
we want the State to be more present to arbitrate the conflicts and investigación & desarrollo vol 20, n° 1 (2012) págs. 32-53
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provide the funds that will finance infrastructures when their cost 
is too high for the financial capacities of the territorial authorities… 
Democracy is a permanent search for balance. 
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